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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding
attacks are one of the biggest concerns for security professionals.
DDoS flooding attacks are typically explicit attempts to disrupt
legitimate users’ access to services. Attackers usually gain access
to a large number of computers by exploiting their vulnerabilities
to set up attack armies (i.e., Botnets). Once an attack army has
been set up, an attacker can invoke a coordinated, large-scale
attack against one or more targets. Developing a comprehensive
defense mechanism against identified and anticipated DDoS
flooding attacks is a desired goal of the intrusion detection and
prevention research community. However, the development of
such a mechanism requires a comprehensive understanding of
the problem and the techniques that have been used thus far in
preventing, detecting, and responding to various DDoS flooding
attacks.
In this paper, we explore the scope of the DDoS flooding
attack problem and attempts to combat it. We categorize the
DDoS flooding attacks and classify existing countermeasures
based on where and when they prevent, detect, and respond to
the DDoS flooding attacks. Moreover, we highlight the need for
a comprehensive distributed and collaborative defense approach.
Our primary intention for this work is to stimulate the research
community into developing creative, effective, efficient, and
comprehensive prevention, detection, and response mechanisms
that address the DDoS flooding problem before, during and after
an actual attack.
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding
attack, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems,
distributed DDoS defense, collaborative DDoS defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
DENIAL of Service (DoS) attacks, which are intendedattempts to stop legitimate users from accessing a
specific network resource, have been known to the network
research community since the early 1980s. In the summer
of 1999, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC)
reported the first Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack incident [1]
and most of the DoS attacks since then have been distributed in
nature. Currently, there are two main methods to launch DDoS
attacks in the Internet. The first method is for the attacker
to send some malformed packets to the victim to confuse
a protocol or an application running on it (i.e., vulnerability
attack [2]). The other method, which is the most common one,
involves an attacker trying to do one or both of the following:
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(i) disrupt a legitimate user’s connectivity by exhausting
bandwidth, router processing capacity or network resources;
these are essentially network/transport-level flooding attacks
[2]; or
(ii) disrupt a legitimate user’s services by exhausting the
server resources (e.g., sockets, CPU, memory, disk/database
bandwidth, and I/O bandwidth); these essentially include
application-level flooding attacks [3].
Today, DDoS attacks are often launched by a network
of remotely controlled, well organized, and widely scattered
Zombies1 or Botnet computers that are simultaneously and
continuously sending a large amount of traffic and/or service
requests to the target system. The target system either responds
so slowly as to be unusable or crashes completely [2],
[4]. Zombies or computers that are part of a botnet are
usually recruited through the use of worms, Trojan horses
or backdoors [5]–[7]. Employing the resources of recruited
computers to perform DDoS attacks allows attackers to launch
a much larger and more disruptive attack. Furthermore, it
becomes more complicated for the defense mechanisms to
recognize the original attacker because of the use of counterfeit
(i.e., spoofed) IP addresses by zombies under the control of
the attacker [8].
Many DDoS flooding attacks had been launched against
different organizations since the summer of 1999 [1]. Most of
the DDoS flooding attacks launched to date have tried to make
the victims’ services unavailable, leading to revenue losses
and increased costs of mitigating the attacks and restoring the
services. For instance, in February 2000, Yahoo! experienced
one of the first major DDoS flooding attacks that kept the
company’s services off the Internet for about 2 hours incurring
a significant loss in advertising revenue [9]. In October 2002, 9
of the 13 root servers2 that provide the Domain Name System
(DNS) service to Internet users around the world shut down
for an hour because of a DDoS flooding attack [10]. Another
major DDoS flooding attack occurred in February 2004 that
made the SCO Group website inaccessible to legitimate users
[11]. This attack was launched by using systems that had
previously been infected by the Mydoom virus [11]. The virus
contained code that instructed thousands of infected computers
1Those devices (e.g., computers, routers, etc.) controlled by attackers are
called zombies or bots which derives from the word ”robot.” The term bots
is commonly referred to software applications running as an automated task
over the Internet (Wikipedia, ”Internet bot”)
2DNS root servers translate logical addresses such as www.google.com into
a corresponding physical IP address, so that users can connect to websites
through more easily remembered names rather than numbers.
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to access SCO’s website at the same time. The Mydoom virus
code was re-used to launch DDoS flooding attacks against
major government news media and financial websites in South
Korea and the United States in July 2009 [12], [13]. On
December 2010, a group calling themselves ”Anonymous”
orchestrated DDoS flooding attacks on organizations such as
Mastercard.com, PayPal, Visa.com and PostFinance [14]. The
attack brought down the Mastercard, PostFinance, and Visa
websites. Most recently since September 2012, online banking
sites of 9 major U.S. banks (i.e., Bank of America, Citigroup,
Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNC, Capital One, Fifth Third
Bank, BB&T, and HSBC) have been continuously the targets
of series of powerful DDoS flooding attacks launched by a
foreign hacktivist group called ”Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber
Fighters” [15]. Consequently, several online banking sites have
slowed or grounded to a halt before they get recovered several
minutes later.
Recent advances in DDoS defense mechanisms have put an
end to the era in which script-kiddies could download a tool
and launch an attack against almost any website. In today’s
DDoS attacks, attackers use more complicated methods to
launch an attack. Despite all of the efforts towards decreasing
the number of DDoS attack incidents, they have expanded
rapidly in the frequency and the size of the targeted networks
and computers. In a recent survey commissioned by VeriSign,
it has been found that 75% of respondents had experienced
one or more attacks between July 2008 and July 2009 [16].
Furthermore, a recent report from Arbor Networks3 indicate
similar data. In their results, they showed that 69% of the
respondents had experienced at least one DDoS attack from
October 2009 through September 2010, and 25% had been
hit by ten such attacks per month [17]. According to Prolexic
Technologies, which offers services to protect against DDoS
attacks, there are 7000 DDoS attacks observed daily and
they believe this number is growing rapidly [18]. DDoS
attacks are also increasing in size, making them harder to
defend against. Arbor Networks found that there has been
around 100% increase in the attack size over 2010, with
attacks breaking the 100Gbps barrier for the first time [17].
Therefore, protecting resources from these frequent and large
DDoS attacks necessitates the research community to focus on
developing a comprehensive DDoS defense mechanism that
can appropriately respond to DDoS attacks before, during and
after an actual attack.
Several taxonomies of DDoS attacks and defense
mechanisms tailored to particular environments have been
proposed in the literature [19]–[21]. Geng et al. focus on
aspects of DDoS attacks unique to wireless ad hoc networks
in [19]. Wood et al. concentrate on distinct features of DDoS
attacks unique to wireless sensor networks in [20].
In this paper, we focus on DDoS flooding attacks and
defense mechanisms in wired networked systems. Here, our
goal is to categorize the existing DDoS flooding attacks and
to provide a comprehensive survey of defense mechanisms
categorized based on where and when they detect and respond
to DDoS flooding attacks. Such a study of DDoS flooding
3Arbor networks include 111 IP network operators worldwide.
attacks and the presented survey is important to understand
the critical issues related to this important network security
problem so as to build more comprehensive and effective
defense mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we provide some insights into the motivation of attackers
in launching DDoS attacks. In section III, we describe
our categorization of different DDoS flooding attacks. We
categorize DDoS flooding attacks into two types based on the
protocol level that is targeted: network/transport-level attacks
and application-level attacks. Then we enumerate some of
the major attacks in each category. In section IV, we briefly
review the structure of botnets and major botnet types that
could be employed by attackers to launch DDoS flooding
attacks. In section V, we describe our classification of the
defense mechanisms for DDoS flooding attacks and discuss
various defense mechanisms against DDoS flooding attacks.
We classify the defense mechanisms against the two types of
DDoS flooding attacks that we present in section III using
two criteria. First we classify both the defense mechanisms
against network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks and the
defense mechanisms against application-level DDoS flooding
attacks based on the location where prevention, detection, and
response to the DDoS flooding attacks occur. Then we classify
both types of defense mechanisms based on the point in time
when they prevent, detect, and respond to DDoS flooding
attacks. Finally, we highlight the need for a comprehensive
distributed and collaborative defense solution against DDoS
flooding attacks by enumerating some of the important
advantages of distributed DDoS defense mechanisms over
centralized ones. In section VI, we enumerate some of the
metrics that can be used in evaluating various DDoS defense
mechanisms; we have also qualitatively compared the defense
mechanisms against DDoS flooding attacks based on their
deployment location. In section VII, we briefly describe
the cyber-insurance policies and their role, as part of the
cyber risk management of a complete cyber defense strategy,
against DDoS flooding attacks. Finally, section VIII concludes
our paper and provides some insights for implementing a
comprehensive distributed collaborative defense mechanism
against DDoS flooding attacks.
II. DDOS: ATTACKERS’ INCENTIVES
DDoS attackers are usually motivated by various incentives.
We can categorize DDoS attacks based on the motivation of
the attackers into five main categories:
1) Financial/economical gain: These attacks are a major
concern of corporations. Because of the nature of their
incentive, attackers of this category are usually the most
technical and the most experienced attackers. Attacks
that are launched for financial gain are often the most
dangerous and hard-to-stop attacks.
2) Revenge: Attackers of this category are generally
frustrated individuals, possibly with lower technical
skills, who usually carry out attacks as a response to a
perceived injustice.
3) Ideological belief : Attackers who belong to this category
are motivated by their ideological beliefs to attack their
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targets [22]. This category is currently one of the major
incentives for the attackers to launch DDoS attacks. For
instance, political incentives have led to recent sabotages
in Estonia 2007 [23], Iran 2009 [24] and WikiLeaks 2010
[25].
4) Intellectual Challenge: Attackers of this category attack
the targeted systems to experiment and learn how to
launch various attacks. They are usually young hacking
enthusiasts who want to show off their capabilities.
Nowadays, there exist various easy to use attack tools
and botnets to rent that even a computer amateur can
avail of in order to launch a successful DDoS attack.
5) Cyberwarfare: Attackers of this category usually belong
to the military or terrorist organizations of a country
and they are politically motivated to attack a wide
range of critical sections of another country [26],
[27]. The potential targets of these attacks include,
but not limited to, executive civilian departments and
agencies, private/public financial organizations (e.g.,
national/commercial banks), energy/water infrastructures
(e.g., [28]), and telecommunications and mobile service
providers. Cyberwar attackers can be considered as very
well trained individuals with ample resources. Attackers
expend a great deal of time and resources towards
disruption of services, which may severely paralyze a
country and incur significant economic impacts.
There have been a few papers in the literature that focus on
analyzing the attackers’ incentives and how those incentives
could be modeled in such a way that decision-making models
could be established to stop and respond to these attacks [22],
[29]. For instance in [29], the authors aim to model and infer
attackers’ intents, objectives, and strategies in order to provide
a predictive or proactive cyber defense. In a similar study
recently conducted by Fultz et al. [22], attackers’ motives
and behaviors when they are faced with diverse defense
patterns, strategies, and the degree of in-dependency have
been analyzed. In doing so, Fultz et al. [22] propose a game
theoretic approach to model security decision-making in which
attackers aim to deny service and defenders try hard to secure
their assets at the same time. Results show that the threat
of prosecution could be enough to prevent an attacker from
attacking the system; however, when the number of attackers
increases, this equilibrium becomes increasingly unbalanced.
One of the fundamental attack prevention methods is to
lessen the attackers’ interests in attacking their targets. For
instance, new policies could be developed and employed.
Hence, studying the attackers’ incentives in launching DDoS
attacks is a promising future research direction. For instance,
researchers can conduct survey or interview studies with
the hackers and cyber-criminals, study recent incidents, and
best/worst prevention/defense practices in order to get some
insights in attackers’ motivations and incentives [30]. Studying
attackers’ incentives help develop effective policies to prevent
attacks. Such policies should eventually lead to loss of interest
by attackers (e.g., attack targets become either technically
impossible to attack or incur substantial financial losses,
attackers face imprisonment up to life).
III. DDOS ATTACK: SCOPE AND CLASSIFICATION
The distributed nature of DDoS attacks makes them
extremely difficult to combat or traceback. Attackers normally
use spoofed (fake) IP addresses in order to hide their true
identity, which makes the traceback of DDoS attacks even
more difficult. Furthermore, there are security vulnerabilities
in many Internet hosts that intruders can exploit. Moreover,
incidents of attacks that target the application layer are
increasing rapidly. One of the necessary steps towards
deploying a comprehensive DDoS defense mechanism is
to understand all the aspects of DDoS attacks. Various
classifications of DDoS attacks have been proposed in the
literature over the past decade [1], [2], [31]–[34], [36]. In this
survey, we are interested in providing a classification of DDoS
flooding attacks based on the protocol level at which the attack
works. We review various DDoS flooding incidents of each
category, some of which have been well reviewed/analyzed
in [1], [2], [31]–[34], [36] and the rest are recent trends of
DDoS flooding attacks. In this paper, we mainly focus on
DDoS flooding attacks as one of the most common forms of
DDoS attacks. Vulnerability attacks, in which attackers exploit
some vulnerabilities or implementation bugs in the software
implementation of a service to bring that down, are not the
focus of this paper.
As we mentioned earlier, DDoS flooding attacks can be
classified into two categories based on the protocol level that
is targeted:
A. Network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks: These
attacks have been mostly launched using TCP, UDP, ICMP and
DNS protocol packets. There are four types of attacks in this
category [2], [36]:
A.1 Flooding attacks: Attackers focus on disrupting
legitimate user’s connectivity by exhausting victim network’s
bandwidth (e.g., Spoofed/non-spoofed UDP flood, ICMP
flood, DNS flood, VoIP Flood and etc. [32], [35]).
A.2 Protocol exploitation flooding attacks: Attackers
exploit specific features or implementation bugs of some of
the victim’s protocols in order to consume excess amounts of
the victim’s resources (e.g., TCP SYN flood, TCP SYN-ACK
flood, ACK & PUSH ACK flood, RST/FIN flood and etc. [32],
[35]).
A.3 Reflection-based flooding attacks: Attackers usually
send forged requests (e.g., ICMP echo request) instead of
direct requests to the reflectors; hence, those reflectors send
their replies to the victim and exhaust victim’s resources (e.g.,
Smurf and Fraggle attacks) [32], [36].
A.4 Amplification-based flooding attacks: Attackers exploit
services to generate large messages or multiple messages for
each message they receive to amplify the traffic towards the
victim. Botnets have been constantly used for both reflection
and amplification purposes. Reflection and amplification
techniques are usually employed in tandem as in the case
of Smurf attack where the attackers send requests with
spoofed source IP addresses (Reflection) to a large number
of reflectors by exploiting IP broadcast feature of the packets
(Amplification) [32], [36].
All of the above attack types with their details have
been well presented in [2], [32], [35], [36]. Hence, we skip
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further explanation of these attacks; instead we focus on the
application-level DDoS flooding attacks as they are growing
rapidly and becoming more severe problems as they are
stealthier than the network/transport-level flooding attacks and
they masquerade as flash crowds.
B. Application-level DDoS flooding attacks: These attacks
focus on disrupting legitimate user’s services by exhausting the
server resources (e.g., Sockets, CPU, memory, disk/database
bandwidth, and I/O bandwidth) [3]. Application-level DDoS
attacks generally consume less bandwidth and are stealthier
in nature compared to volumetric attacks since they are
very similar to benign traffic. However, application-level
DDoS flooding attacks usually have the same impact to
the services since they target specific characteristics of
applications such as HTTP, DNS, or Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP). Here we briefly describe the DNS amplification
flooding attack and the SIP flooding attack as two of
the famous application-level reflection/amplification flooding
attacks embracing DNS and SIP protocols. Then we classify
various flavors of application-level flooding attacks that
employ the HTTP protocol since these attacks are consistently
reported as the major types of recent DDoS flooding attacks
[38].
B.1 Reflection/amplification based flooding attacks
[2], [36]: These attacks use the same techniques as
their network/transport-level peers (i.e., sending forged
application-level protocol requests to the large number of
reflectors). For instance, the DNS amplification attack employs
both reflection and amplification techniques. The attackers
(zombies) generate small DNS queries with forged source IP
addresses which can generate a large volume of network traffic
since DNS response messages may be substantially larger than
DNS query messages. Then this large volume of network
traffic is directed towards the targeted system to paralyze
it. Another application-level attack example that employs
reflection technique is VoIP flooding [35]. This attack is a
variation of an application specific UDP flooding. Attackers
usually send spoofed VoIP packets through SIP at a very
high packet rate and with a very large source IP range.
The victim VoIP server has to distinguish the proper VoIP
connections from the forged ones that consume significant
amount of resources. VoIP flooding can overwhelm a network
with packets with randomized or fixed source IP addresses. If
the source IP address has not been changed the VoIP flooding
attack mimics traffic from large VoIP servers and can be very
difficult to identify since it resembles good traffic.
B.2 HTTP flooding attacks [3], [35], [37], [39]: There are
four types of attacks in this category:
B.2.1 Session flooding attacks: In this type of attack,
session connection request rates from the attackers are higher
than the requests from the legitimate users; hence, this
exhausts the server resources and leads to DDoS flooding
attack on the server. One of the famous attacks in this category
is the HTTP get/post flooding attack (a.k.a., excessive VERB)
[35] in which attackers generate a large number of valid HTTP
requests (get/post) to a victim web server. Attackers usually
employ botnets to launch these attacks. Since each of the bots
can generate a large number of valid requests (usually more
than 10 requests a second) there is no need for a large number
of bots to launch a successful attack. HTTP get/post flooding
attacks are non-spoofed attacks.
B.2.2 Request flooding attacks: In this type of attack,
attackers send sessions that contain more number of requests
than usual and leads to a DDoS flooding attack on the
server. One of the well-known attacks in this category is the
single-session HTTP get/post flooding (a.k.a., excessive VERB
single session) [35]. This attack is a variation of HTTP get/post
flooding attack which employs the feature of HTTP 1.1 to
allow multiple requests within a single HTTP session. Hence,
the attacker can limit the session rate of an HTTP attack and
bypass session rate limitation defense mechanisms of many
security systems.
B.2.3 Asymmetric attacks: In this type of attack, attackers
send sessions that contain high-workload requests. Here, we
enumerate some of the famous attacks in this category.
B.2.3.a Multiple HTTP get/post flood (a.k.a., multiple VERB
single request) [35]: This attack is also a variation of HTTP
get/post flood attack. Here, an attacker creates multiple HTTP
requests by forming a single packet embedded with multiple
requests and without issuing them one after another within a
single HTTP session [35]. This way attacker can still maintain
high loads on the victim server with a low attack packet rate
which makes the attacker nearly invisible to netflow anomaly
detection techniques. Also, attackers can easily bypass deep
packet inspection techniques if they carefully select the HTTP
VERB.
B.2.3.b Faulty Application [35]: In this attack, attackers
take advantage of websites with poor designs or improper
integration with databases. For instance, they can employ
SQL-like injections to generate requests to lock up database
queries. These attacks are highly specific and effective because
they consume server resources (memory, CPU, etc.).
B.2.4 Slow request/response attacks: In this type of attack,
attackers send sessions that contain high-workload requests.
There are a number of famous attacks in this category that we
describe in the following.
B.2.4.a Slowloris attack (a.k.a, slow headers attack) [40]:
Slowloris is a HTTP get-based attack that can bring down
a Web server using a limited number of machines or even
a single machine. The attacker sends partial HTTP requests
(not a complete set of request headers [41]) that continuously
and rapidly grow, slowly update, and never close. The attack
continues until all available sockets are taken up by these
requests and the Web server becomes inaccessible. Attackers’
source addresses are usually not spoofed.
B.2.4.b HTTP fragmentation attack [35]: Similar to
Slowloris, the goal of this attack is to bring down a Web
server by holding up the HTTP connections for a long time
without raising any alarms. Attackers (bots) (non-spoofed)
establish a valid HTTP connection with a web server. Then
they fragment legitimate HTTP packets into tiny fragments
and send each fragment as slow as the server time out allows.
Using this approach, by opening multiple sessions on each bot,
the attacker can silently bring down a Web server with just a
handful of bots.
B.2.4.c Slowpost attack (a.k.a, slow request bodies or
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R-U-Dead-Yet (RUDY) attack) [42]: Wong et al. present a very
similar attack to Slowloris that send HTTP post commands
slowly to bring down Web servers. The attacker sends a
complete HTTP header that defines the ”content-length” field
of the post message body as it sends this request for benign
traffic. Then it sends the data to fill the message body at a
rate of one byte every two minutes. Hence, the server waits
for each message body to be completed while Slowpost attack
grows rapidly which causes the DDoS flooding attack on the
Web server.
B.2.4.d Slowreading attack (a.k.a, slow response attack)
[43]: Shekyan presents another type of attack in this category
which works by slowly reading the response instead of slowly
sending the requests. This attack achieves its purpose by
setting a smaller receive window-size than the target server’s
send buffer. The TCP protocol maintains open connections
even if there is no data communication; hence, the attacker
can force the server to keep a large number of connections
open and eventually causes the DDoS flooding attack on the
server.
The message here is that DDoS, like most malicious
security threats, is multidimensional. One must be prepared
to detect and counter both the more well-known attacks that
aggressively assault systems and the novel attacks that will slip
in and undermine systems before you know what hit them.
IV. BOTNET-BASED DDOS ATTACKS
As mentioned earlier, botnets are the dominant mechanisms
that facilitate DDoS flooding attacks on computer networks
or applications. Most of the recent and most problematic
application layer DDoS flooding attacks have employed
botnets. In this section, we present a comprehensive study of
current botnet architectures and the tools that have been used
to launch DDoS flooding attacks.
According to Peng et al. [32], there are two main reasons
that make the development of an effective DDoS defense
mechanism even more challenging when attackers employ
zombies to launch DDoS flooding attacks. First, a large
number of zombies involved in the attack facilitates attackers
to make the attacks larger in scale and more disruptive.
Second, zombies’ IP addresses are usually spoofed under
the control of the attacker, which makes it very difficult to
traceback the attack traffic even to the zombies.
Usually a group of zombies that are controlled by an
attacker (a.k.a. Master) form a botnet. Botnets consist of
masters, handlers, and bots (a.k.a. Agents), as depicted in
Figure 1. The handlers are means of communication that
attackers (i.e., masters) use to communicate indirectly with
their bots (i.e., to command and control their army). For
instance, handlers can be programs installed on a set of
compromised devices (e.g., network servers) that attackers
communicate with to send commands. However, most of these
installed programs leave unique footprints behind that are
detectable with current antivirus software. Hence, currently
attackers use other methods (e.g., Internet Relay Chat (IRC))
to communicate with their bots in order to send commands and
control them. Bots are devices that have been compromised
Fig. 1. Elements of a Botnet.
by the handlers. Bots are those systems that will eventually
carry out the attack on the victim’s system. Figure 1 shows
all the elements of a botnet. Botnets can have hundreds of
various implementations. Based on how bots are controlled by
the masters, botnets are classified into three major categories
[8], [44]: IRC-based, Web-based, and P2P-based. Since the
first two categories have been widely used to launch DDoS
flooding attacks, we briefly explain them and introduce some
of the tools that have been used in each category.
1) IRC-based [45]: IRC is an on-line text-based instant
messaging protocol in the Internet. It has client/server
architecture with default channels to communicate
between servers. IRC can connect hundreds of clients
via multiple servers. Using IRC channels as handlers,
attackers can use legitimate IRC ports to send commands
to the bots making it much more difficult to track
the DDoS command and control structure. Furthermore,
an attacker can easily hide his presence because of
the large volume of traffic that IRC servers usually
have. Additionally, an attacker can easily share files to
distribute the malicious code. Moreover, attackers can
simply log on to the IRC server and see the list of
all the available bots instead of maintaining their list
locally at their site. The major limitation of botnets with
a centralized command and control (C&C) infrastructure
such as IRC-based botnets is that the servers are a
potential central points of failure. That is, the entire
botnet can be shutdown if the defender captures the C&C
servers. Several well-known IRC-based botnet tools have
been developed and used over the years for launching
DDoS attacks such as: Trinity v3 [46] (conducts UDP,
TCP SYN, TCP ACK, and TCP NUL flood attacks), and
Kaiten [47] (conducts UDP, TCP, SYN, and PUSH+ACH
flood attacks).
2) Web-based (a.k.a., HTTP-based [48]): More recently,
botnets have started using HTTP as a communication
protocol to send commands to the bots making it much
more difficult to track the DDoS command and control
structure. Web-based botnets do not maintain connections
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with a C&C server like IRC-based botnets do. Instead,
each Web bot periodically downloads the instructions
using web requests. Web-based botnets are stealthier
since they hide themselves within legitimate HTTP traffic.
Bots are configured and controlled through complex PHP
scripts and they use encrypted communication over HTTP
(port 80) or HTTPS (port 443) protocol. Three of the
well-known and widely-used Web-based botnet tools are:
BlackEnergy [49], Low-Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [50] 4,
and Aldi [52].
Some of the botnets could also provide their customers with
some additional malicious services. For instance, McAfee
reports that in a recent DDoS attack incident against South
Korean government websites, the botnet that was used to
launch the attack had employed resiliency techniques in order
to evade its capture. The code also had destructive capabilities
in its payload to destroy the compromised hosts, whenever
required, by overwriting and deleting all the data on the hard
drive [53].
V. DDOS DEFENSE: SCOPE AND CLASSIFICATION
Usually by the time a DDoS flooding attack is detected,
there is nothing that can be done except to disconnect the
victim from the network and manually fix the problem. DDoS
flooding attacks waste a lot of resources (e.g., processing time,
space, etc.) on the paths that lead to the targeted machine;
hence, the ultimate goal of any DDoS defense mechanism is
to detect them as soon as possible and stop them as near as
possible to their sources. Figure 2 shows that detection and
response can be performed in different places on the paths
between the victim and the sources of the attack. As depicted
in the diagram, a DDoS flooding attack resembles a funnel
in which attack flows are generated in a dispersed area (i.e.,
sources), forming the top of the funnel. The victim, at the
narrow end of a funnel, receives all the attack flows generated.
Thus, it is not difficult to see that detecting a DDoS flooding
attack is relatively easier at the destination (victim), since all
the flows can be observed at the destination. On the contrary,
it is difficult for an individual source network of the attack
to detect the attack unless a large number of attack flows are
initiated from that source. Obviously, it is desirable to respond
to the attack flows closer to the sources of the attacks, but there
is always a trade-off between accuracy of the detection and
how close to the source of attack the prevention and response
mechanism can stop or respond to the attack.
Moreover, the number of normal packets that reach the
victims even when the victims are under a DDoS attack (i.e.,
in the middle of a DDoS attack) increases when response
mechanisms (e.g., packet filtering) drop the attack packets
closer to the sources of the attack. Otherwise, as attack flows
reach closer to the victims, packet filtering mechanisms drop
more legitimate packets that are destined to the victims5.
4LOIC Web-based botnet has been recently used to launch DDoS flooding
attack against Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of
investigation (FBI) [51]
5During large scale DDoS attacks, victims or their immediate upstream
networks drop all the packets destined to the victims.
Several mechanisms to combat DDoS flooding attacks have
been proposed to date in the literature [2], [31]–[34], [36]. In
this section we classify the defense mechanisms against two
types of DDoS flooding attacks that we presented in section III
using two criteria. We believe that these classification
criteria are important in devising robust defense solutions.
The first criterion for classification is the location where
the defense mechanism is implemented (i.e., Deployment
location). We classify the defense mechanisms against
network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks into four
categories: source-based, destination-based, network-based,
and hybrid (a.k.a. distributed) and the defense mechanisms
against application-level DDoS flooding attacks into two
categories: destination-based, and hybrid (a.k.a. distributed)
based on their deployment location. Figure 3 shows
the classification of the defense mechanisms against
network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks based on their
deployment location in a simple network of Autonomous
Systems (AS). There is no network-based defense mechanism
against application-level DDoS flooding attacks since the
application-level DDoS flooding attack traffic is not accessible
at the layer 2 (switches) and layer 3 (routers) devices.
Classification of DDoS defense mechanisms based on their
deployment location was first presented in [1] and it is used
by some other surveys as one of their classification criteria
[2], [4], [8], [36]. In this paper, we extend this classification
criterion by adding a hybrid category and analyzing several
recent DDoS defense mechanisms in each category.
The second criterion for classification is the point of
time when the DDoS defense mechanisms should act in
response to a possible DDoS flooding attack. Based on
this criterion we classify both defense mechanisms against
application-level and network/transport-level DDoS flooding
attacks into three categories (i.e., three points of defense
against the flooding attack): before the attack (attack
prevention), during the attack (attack detection), and after
the attack (attack source identification and response) [2].
However, a comprehensive DDoS defense mechanism should
include all three defenses since there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to the DDoS problem. Our contribution to the last
classification criterion is to classify and enumerate most
of the recent defense mechanisms against DDoS flooding
attacks into the aforementioned categories. Figure 4 shows the
above mentioned taxonomy of the defense mechanisms against
DDoS flooding attacks.
A. Classification based on the deployment location
A.1. Defense mechanisms against network/transport-level
DDoS flooding attacks
In the following, we discuss the defense mechanisms in each
of the categories of the first classification criterion.
A.1.1. Source-based mechanisms: Source-based
mechanisms are deployed near the sources of the attack
to prevent network customers from generating DDoS flooding
attacks. These mechanisms can take place either at the edge
routers of the source’s local network or at the access routers
of an Autonomous System (AS) that connects to the sources’
ZARGAR et al.: A SURVEY OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS AGAINST DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) FLOODING ATTACKS 7
Attack Sources 
Destinations (Victims) of the attack  
Further upstream intermediate 
network 
Upstream intermediate network 
Immediate upstream network to the Victim 
D
etectio
n
 a
ccu
ra
cy in
crea
ses  
P
reven
tio
n
 a
n
d
 resp
o
n
se m
ech
a
n
ism
s b
etter sa
tisfy D
D
o
S d
efen
se’s u
ltim
a
te g
o
a
l 
N
u
m
b
er o
f n
o
rm
a
l p
a
ckets in
 th
e m
id
d
le o
f a
 D
D
o
S a
tta
ck in
crea
ses  
Fig. 2. Different locations for performing DDoS detection and response.
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edge routers [1]. Various source-based mechanisms have been
designed to defend against DDoS flooding attacks at the
source; some of the major ones are as follows:
A.1.1.a. Ingress/Egress6 filtering at the sources’ edge
routers [55]: The current IP protocol allows source hosts to
alter source addresses in the IP packets. Packets with spoofed
source IP addresses cause a huge problem in detecting DDOS
flooding attacks. Victims cannot distinguish attack packets
from legitimate ones based on source addresses. Although
the IPSec protocol [56], [57] can address this problem by
authenticating the source addresses of IP packets, this method
is not widely deployed among service providers because of its
increased overhead. Ingress/Egress filtering mechanisms have
been proposed to detect and filter packets with spoofed IP
addresses at the source’s edge routers based on the valid IP
address range internal to the network. However, the spoofed
packets will not be detected if their addresses are still in the
valid internal IP address range. For instance, if a packet is
sent out from host i in the network M with the source address
of host j, which is also valid in network M, the filtering
will not detect it as a spoofed address. Furthermore, using
6It is called either Ingress or Egress depending on where you stand in the
network and apply the filters.
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Ingress/Egress filtering with mobile IP users, network traffic
from a legitimate mobile IP (i.e., IPv.4) address has to be
tunnelled in order to avoid filtering. Moreover, considering
the current trend towards employing botnets to launch various
attacks, attackers can still attack their targets by employing the
pool of zombies with genuine IP addresses available through
botnets.
A.1.1.b. D-WARD [58], [59]: This scheme aims to detect
DDOS flooding attack traffic by monitoring both inbound
and outbound traffic of a source network and comparing
the network traffic information with predefined normal flow
models. D-WARD attempts to stop attack traffic originating
from a network at the border of the source network. Attack
flows are identified and filtered if they mismatch the normal
flow models. For instance, in the TCP protocol every packet
will be acknowledged by the receiver. Hence, the normal traffic
model for TCP could be defined by a maximum allowed ratio
of the number of packets sent and received in the aggregate
TCP flow to the peer. A normal model for all other traffic
types could also be defined in a similar way. The calibration
of the normal model for each kind of traffic enhances the
false positive rates. Although D-WARD can generate filtering
rules at the source, it consumes more memory space and CPU
cycles than some of the network-based defense mechanisms.
Furthermore, there is no strong incentives for the providers
to employ D-WARD as it protects the others’ network but not
the providers’ network from DDoS flooding attacks. Moreover,
D-WARD can be easily bypassed by attackers who can control
their traffic to be within a normal range.
A.1.1.c. MUlti-Level Tree for Online Packet Statistics
(MULTOPS) [60] and Tabulated Online Packet Statistics
(TOPS) [61]: MULTOPS is a heuristic and a data-structure
that network devices (e.g., routers) at the source subnet can
use to detect and filter DDoS flooding attacks. Normally
the rate of traffic in one direction is proportional to that
in the opposite direction during normal operations on the
Internet [60]. Hence, a significant difference between the
rates of traffic going to and coming from a host or subnet
can indicate that the network prefix is either the source or
the destination of an attack. MULTOPS detects and filters
DDoS flooding attacks based on this mechanism. One major
drawback of MULTOPS is that it uses a dynamic tree structure
for monitoring packet rates for each IP address which makes
it a vulnerable target of a memory exhaustion attack [60]. An
alternative approach called TOPS [61] provides an efficient
method for detecting packet flow imbalances based on a
hashing scheme that uses a small set of field length lookup
tables. TOPS can improve the accuracy and reduce the false
alarm rate of the system by monitoring traffic by protocol,
and maintaining a probability distribution of traffic flow rates.
Furthermore, TOPS’s efficiency and accuracy makes it suited
for implementation in the routers.
Both MULTOPS and TOPS are based on the assumption
that incoming and outgoing traffic rates are proportional,
which is not always the case. For instance, rates for multimedia
streams are not proportional and usually the traffic rates from
the servers are significantly higher than the ones from clients.
Hence, MULTOPS and TOPS can have high false negative
rates. Furthermore, attackers can increase the proportion of
the incoming and outgoing traffic rates legitimately (e.g.,
downloading large files from different ftp servers through a
number of genuine sources); hence, during the attack, the
attack traffic will be undetected because of the similarity of
the attack traffic rates to the normal traffic rates which have
been legitimately increased.
A.1.1.d. MANAnet’s Reverse Firewall [62]: As opposed to a
traditional firewall, which protects a network from incoming
packets, the reverse firewall protects the outside from packet
flooding attacks that originate from within a network. A
reverse firewall limits the rate at which it forwards packets that
are not replies to other packets that recently were forwarded
in the other direction. Of course, it must be possible to send
some packets that are not replies, for instance, to start a new
conversation. However, such packets must not be transmitted
at a high rate. One of the main disadvantages of the reverse
firewall is that it is manual and requires the administrators’
involvement. Furthermore, the reverse firewall’s configuration
cannot be dynamically changed at runtime. Moreover, there
is no benefit (e.g., financial gain) for the source networks to
deploy costly reverse firewalls since there is no benefit for the
source networks.
Source-based defense mechanisms aim to detect and filter
the attack traffic at the sources of the attack; however, they
are not entirely effective against DDoS flooding attacks.
There are three main reasons which make these mechanisms
a poor choice against DDoS flooding attacks. First, the
sources of the attacks can be distributed in different domains
making it difficult for each of the sources to detect and filter
attack flows accurately. Second, it is difficult to differentiate
between legitimate and attack traffic near the sources, since
the volume of the traffic may not be big enough as the
traffic typically aggregates at points closer to the destinations.
Finally, the motivation for deployment of the source-based
mechanisms is low since it is unclear who (i.e., customers
or service providers) would pay the expenses associated with
these services. Hence, pure source-based mechanisms are not
efficient and effective against DDoS flooding attacks.
A.1.2. Destination-based mechanisms: In the
destination-based defense mechanisms, detection and
response is mostly done at the destination of the attack (i.e.,
victim). There exist various destination-based mechanisms
that can take place either at the edge routers or the access
routers of the destinations’ AS. These mechanisms can
closely observe the victim, model its behavior and detect
any anomalies. Some of the major destination-based DDoS
defense mechanisms are as follows:
A.1.2.a. IP Traceback mechanisms [63]: The process of
tracing back the forged IP packets to their true sources rather
than the spoofed IP addresses that was used in the attack is
called traceback. There are various IP traceback mechanisms
that have been proposed to date [64]. These mechanisms
can be classified into two main categories. The first category
is packet marking mechanisms [64]–[66]. Usually routers
in the path to the victim mark packets (i.e., add routers’
identification to each packet) so that the victim can identify
the path of attack traffic and distinguish it from legitimate
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traffic after the detection. However, storing the entire path in
the IP identification field of each packet needs certain coding
schemes and these schemes sometimes are not able to assign
each mark to a unique path; hence, false positive rates of these
mechanisms are still high. In other words, legitimate packets
could be treated as attack packets. The second category is
link testing mechanisms [67], [68] in which the traceback
process usually starts from the router closest to the victim and
iteratively tests its upstream links until it can be determined
which link is used to carry the attacker’s traffic (i.e., the
traceback process is recursively repeated on the upstream
router until the source is reached).
All of the traceback mechanisms have serious deployment
and operational challenges [69]. One of the fundamental
deployment and operational challenges is ensuring a sufficient
number of routers that support traceback before it is
effective. Moreover, attackers can also generate traceback
messages; consequently, some form of authentication of
traceback messages is necessary. Furthermore, most of the
traceback mechanisms have heavy computational, network or
management overheads [69].
A.1.2.b. Management Information Base (MIB) [70]: MIB
data is comprised of parameters that indicate various packet
and routing statistics. Continuously analyzing MIB can help
victims to identify when a DDoS attack is occurring. During
a DDoS attack, it is possible to map ICMP, UDP, and TCP
packets’ statistical abnormalities to a specific DDoS attack by
identifying statistical patterns related to different parameters
[71], [72]. Furthermore, this mechanism can also provide ways
to adjust network parameters to compensate for the unwanted
traffic (e.g., adding more resources to the target network) [70].
Although analysing MIB data sounds promising in detecting
DDoS attacks, its effectiveness needs to be further evaluated
in a real network environment.
A.1.2.c. Packet marking and filtering mechanisms [73],
[74], [76]: These mechanisms aim to mark legitimate packets
at each router along their path to the destination so that
victims’ edge routers can filter the attack traffic. These
mechanisms let the receivers install dynamic network filters
to block the undesirable traffic. Packet filtering mechanisms
are dependent in part on the strength of the attackers, and
when it increases, filters become ineffective and they cannot
properly be installed. Several destination-based packet filtering
mechanisms have been proposed in the literature so far. Here
we briefly describe some of these proposed mechanisms:
History-based IP filtering [73]: By employing this
mechanism, victims can filter bandwidth (flooding) attack
traffic according to the history they have maintained while
they were not under attack. In particular, the target destination
can use an IP address database to keep all the IP addresses
that frequently appear at the target. During a bandwidth
attack, the target only admits the packets whose source IP
addresses belong to the IP address database. This technique
helps destination hosts in resource management when their
links to the upstream network becomes a bottleneck during
a DDoS flooding attack. However, any large-scale DDoS
attack that simulates normal traffic behaviour will defeat such
mechanisms.
Hop-count filtering [74]: In this mechanism, information
about a source IP address and its corresponding hops from
a destination are recorded in a table at the destination side
when the destination is not under attack. Once an attack alarm
is raised, the victim inspects the incoming packets’ source
IP addresses and their corresponding hops to differentiate the
spoofed packets. It is not necessary for routers to collaborate
mutually in this mechanism; however, it is difficult to ensure
the integrity and accuracy of the source IP addresses and their
corresponding hops from the victim. In other words, attackers
can spoof IP addresses with the same hop-count as their
machines do. Moreover, legitimate packets can be identified as
spoofed ones if their IP to hop-count mappings are inaccurate
or if the hop-count updates has a delay [75].
Path Identifier (Pi) [76]: In this mechanism, a path
fingerprint is embedded in each packet which enables a victim
to identify packets traversing the same paths through the
Internet on a per packet basis, despite of the source IP address
spoofing. Pi is a per-packet deterministic mechanism which
means that each packet that is travelling along the same path
carries the same identifier. This feature allows the victim
to employ the Pi mark to filter out packets matching the
attackers’ identifiers on a per packet basis which is considered
as a proactive role in defending against a DDoS attack. Pi is
effective if about half of the routers in the Internet participate
in packet marking [76]. The main disadvantage of Pi is that
the limitation on the size of identification field may result in
the same path information representing different paths. This
can decrease the performance of Pi mechanism (i.e., increased
false positive/false negative rates).
A.1.2.d. Packet dropping based on the level of congestion:
These destination-based DDoS defense mechanisms drop
suspicious packets when the network links are congested to
a certain level. Packetscore [77] is an example of this type.
Packetscore, proposed by Kim et al. in [77], is an
automated attack characterization, selective packet discarding
and overload control mechanism. The key idea is to
prioritize packets based on per packet score which estimates
the legitimacy of a packet given the attribute values it
carries. Then, once the score of a packet is computed
at Detecting-Differentiating-Discarding routers (3D-R) by
employing a Bayesian-theoretic metric, a score-based selective
packet discarding method at the destination is performed.
The dropping threshold for the packet discarding method is
dynamically adjusted based on (1) the score distribution of
recent incoming packets and (2) the current level of overload
of the system. However, Kim et al. did not provide any results
to show how the time-scale of updates of the scorebooks,
score cumulative distribution function (CDF), and dynamic
discarding threshold could impact the response time and the
decision of their proposed selective packet discarding scheme
when subjected to more orchestrated synchronized DDoS
attacks.
Most of the destination-based mechanisms cannot
accurately detect and respond to the attack before it reaches
the victims and wastes resources on the paths to the victims;
hence, they are not capable of detecting and responding to
the DDoS attack traffic properly. Therefore, network-based
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DDoS defense mechanisms have been proposed to address
this problem and to help both source and destination based
mechanisms to carry out their duties more accurately.
A.1.3. Network-based mechanisms: These mechanisms are
deployed inside networks and mainly on the routers of the ASs
[78]. Detecting attack traffic and creating a proper response to
stop it at intermediate networks is an ideal goal of this category
of defense mechanisms. Some of the main network-based
DDoS defense mechanisms are as follows:
A.1.3.a. Route-based packet filtering [79], [80]: Route-based
packet filtering extends ingress filtering to the routers at the
core of the Internet. The traffic on each link in the core of
the Internet usually originates from a limited set of source
addresses. Hence, if an unexpected source address appears in
an IP packet on a link, then it is assumed that the source
address has been spoofed, and hence the packet can be filtered.
However, this mechanism is ineffective against DDoS attacks
if attackers either use genuine IP addresses instead of spoofed
ones or spoof with carefully chosen source IP addresses that
are not going to be filtered.
A.1.3.b. Detecting and filtering malicious routers [81]:
Routers are continuously targeted and compromised. They can
be leveraged to empower DDoS attacks. A range of specialized
anomaly detection protocols have been proposed to detect
malicious routers involved in packet forwarding between
routers. For instance, Watchers [82] detects misbehaving
routers that launch DDoS attacks by absorbing, discarding
or misrouting packets. It uses the conservation of flow
principle to examine flows between neighbors and endpoints.
In [83], some of the implicit assumptions of Watchers
that do not hold have been modified so the cost and
complexity of Watchers algorithm is increased. Even with
these modifications, Watchers requires explicit communication
among the routers. Furthermore, it cannot detect spoofed
packets. Even worse, such packets could be used by the
attacker to misidentify a target as a bad router. Watchers
can only detect compromised routers and it is vulnerable to
misbehaving hosts. It also assumes that every router knows the
topology of the network, which is not a feasible assumption
for large networks.
There are other mechanisms in which the detection
and filtering of malicious routers is based on routers’
trustworthiness [84], [85]. For instance in [84], a Bayesian
inference model has been employed to evaluate the
trustworthiness of an access router with regards to forwarding
packets without modifying their source IP addresses. In this
approach, the trust values for the access routers are computed
by a router (judge) that samples all the traffic being forwarded
by the access routers. Employing trust calculations, decision
making, and trust negotiations among the routers in order to
efficiently and effectively detect and filter the malicious routers
is the ultimate goal of these mechanisms.
Network-based mechanisms usually lead to high storage and
processing overheads at the routers. These overheads get even
worse if each router does redundant detection and response
through the path to the destination [86], which can present a
significant burden. Various researchers have proposed different
approaches to reduce the amount of storage and consumption
of CPU cycles for detection and response at the routers such
as Bloom filters [78] [87], Packet sampling [88], etc. But these
approaches are not sufficient when routers still do redundant
jobs. Moreover, reducing the amount of redundant detection
and response between the routers requires coordination among
them [86]. Different communication protocols have been
proposed to coordinate attack detection and response among
the routers [1]. However, network-based defense mechanisms
that have been proposed thus far are not effective and efficient
because of their large overhead of network communication.
For instance, the lack of bandwidth during DDoS attacks may
limit the protocol for communication and cause network-based
mechanisms to fail.
A.1.4. Hybrid (Distributed) mechanisms: In most of
the previously discussed categories of DDoS flooding
defense mechanisms (source-based, destination-based, and
network-based), there is no strong cooperation among the
deployment points. Furthermore, detection and response is
mostly done centrally either by each of the deployment points
(e.g., source-based mechanisms) or by some responsible points
within the group of deployment points (e.g., network-based
mechanisms). Hence, we call these categories of DDoS
defense mechanisms centralized. As opposed to centralized
defense mechanisms, hybrid defense mechanisms are deployed
at (or their components are distributed over) multiple locations
such as source, destination or intermediate networks and there
is usually cooperation among the deployment points. For
instance, detection can be done at the victim side and the
response can be initiated and distributed to other nodes by the
victim. Some of the hybrid DDoS defense mechanisms are as
follows:
A.1.4.a. Hybrid packet marking and throttling/filtering
mechanisms: All of the previously presented marking and
filtering mechanisms place the attack detection module and
the packet filtering module at the same location. Hybrid
packet throttling mechanisms usually place the attack detection
modules near the victims and execute packet filtering close
to the attack sources. In some of these mechanisms, victims
under attack install a router throttle at upstream routers several
hops away in order to limit the forwarding rate of the packets
destined to those victims. Basically these mechanisms are
packet filtering infrastructures that are leveraging the routers’
support to filter out DDoS flows. It is important to note that
these mechanisms only limit the rate of malicious packets and
do not harm legitimate flows. Here, we briefly describe some
of these mechanisms:
Aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC) [89] and
Pushback [89], [90]: ACC rate limits the aggregates rather
than IP sources. Aggregates are subsets of traffic defined
by some characteristics such as specific destination port or
source IP address. In ACC, routers detect aggregates that
are overwhelming them by using samples of packet drops
in their queues. Then they send a pushback message to
the upstream routers along with the information about the
aggregates to request a rate limit by presenting a rate limit
value. If the aggregate packets respect the rate limit they can
still go through their path to their destinations, otherwise they
are dropped to limit their rate and pushback messages are
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propagated to the upstream routers [89] [90]. Both ACC and
Pushback are not effective against uniformly distributed attack
sources because of voluminous traffic.
Attack Diagnosis (AD) and parallel-AD [91]: AD combines
the concepts of pushback and packet marking. A victim
host activates AD, after an attack has been detected, by
sending AD-related commands to its upstream routers. Upon
receiving such commands, the AD-enabled upstream routers
deterministically mark each packet destined for the victim
with the information about the input interface that processed
that packet. The victim can then traceback the attack traffic
to its source by employing the router interface information
which is recorded in the packet marking process. Then, the
victim issues messages that command AD-enabled routers to
filter attack packets close to the source after the traceback is
completed. The AD commands can be authenticated by the
TTL field of the IP header without relying on any global key
distribution infrastructure in the Internet. AD is not effective
against large-scale attacks. An extension to AD, called Parallel
AD (PAD), has been proposed to address AD’s shortcomings
against large-scale attacks. The main difference between PAD
and AD is that PAD can diagnose and stop the traffic from
more than one router at the same time. Hence, PAD is capable
of throttling traffic coming from a large number of attack
sources at the same time [91].
TRACK [92]: This mechanism also combines IP traceback,
packet marking, and packet filtering. TRACK is composed
of two components: router port marking module and packet
filtering module. The router port marking module marks
packets by probabilistically writing a router interface’s port
number, a locally unique 6-digit identifier, to the packets it
transmits. Upon receiving the packets marked by each router
in an attacking path, a victim machine can then use the
information contained in those packets to trace the attack back
to its source. Then, the packet filtering component employs
the information contained in the same packets to filter the
malicious packets at the upstream routers, thus effectively
mitigating attacks. One of the main advantages of TRACK
over previously discussed throttling mechanisms is its low
communication and computation overhead [92]. TRACK has
some limitations to be addressed in the future:
(i) Attackers can modify the marking fields of the packets in
order to avoid being located; hence, TRACK is still vulnerable
to these attacks; and
(ii) TRACK is claimed to be an effective approach for
IP traceback but not effective for attack traceback in which
the objective is to identify the real attacker that ordered the
zombies to launch the DDoS attack. In other words, TRACK
cannot find the IP addresses of the attackers that actually
launch the attack.
A.1.4.b. DEFensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh (DEFCOM)
[93]: DEFCOM is a distributed framework to enable
information and service exchange among all of the defense
nodes. It attempts to shift from isolated defense architectures
towards a distributed framework of heterogeneous defense
nodes in which all the nodes collaborate and cooperate to
achieve an effective defense . For instance, since attack
detection is best done near the victim and response is most
effective at the source of the attack, defense nodes should be
specialized for different aspects of the defense; hence, different
nodes in their proposed distributed architecture are responsible
for their specialized defense ability and they must be able to
communicate with others in order to successfully detect and
respond to the attacks. Each node in their proposed framework
must at least support the followings: (i) Attack alerts generated
from the alert generators should be sent to the rest of the
network; (ii) Rate-Limit requests should be sent upstream; (iii)
Resource requests that each node issues should be sent to its
downstream neighbors; and (iv) Traffic Classification nodes
must communicate with their downstream neighbors to ensure
that the bulk of legitimate traffic will not be dropped.
DEFCOM is comprised of heterogeneous and distributed
defense nodes organized into a P2P network where the nodes
are communicating with each other to achieve cooperative
defense. The P2P structure and topology construction of the
DEFCOM defense nodes allows for the approximation of
underlying topology; hence, when an attack alert is raised,
it will be possible to discover victim-rooted traffic tree.
Then, upstream and downstream relationships among peers
is identified and proper rate limits to control the attack traffic
is created and placed as close as possible to the sources of
the attack. At the same time, classifier nodes will differentiate
legitimate traffic from attack traffic.
Classifier nodes in the DEFCOM require an in-line
deployment and their malfunction deters a wide deployment
of classifier functionality in the network. Therefore, there will
be no means to verify if the traffic which has been received
by a node is legitimate or attack and rate limiters severely
rate-limit all the traffic coming from these sources. If it is
assumed that a significant portion of networks in the Internet
will be legacy networks, this results in a DoS attack to the
legitimate clients from legacy networks during attacks; this is
the main disadvantage of the DEFCOM framework.
A.1.4.c. COSSACK [94]: This mechanism is built on all
of the border routers of the edge networks, with the core
software system called watchdog. This mechanism is based on
a number of assumptions. First, the border routers are assumed
to have ingress/egress filtering mechanisms implemented.
Second, border routers can prevent IP spoofing by employing
ingress/egress filtering. The final critical set of assumptions
Papadopoulos et al. made in [94] consist of the existence of
an attack signature, the capability of border routers to filter
packets based on the signature, and the connection availability
between watchdogs [94]. Therefore, with all the supports
from different implemented components that they assume, the
application layer watchdog could multicast attack notifications
from the victim side to the source side and stop DDoS attack
flows around the source employing the ingress/egress filtering
mechanisms implemented on the border routers. COSSACK
is, however, unable to handle attacks from legacy networks
that do not deploy COSSACK defense mechanism.
A.1.4.d. Capability-based mechanisms [95]: These
mechanisms let the destination explicitly authorize the traffic
it desires to receive (e.g., Portcullis [96], Traffic Validation
Architecture (TVA) [97], [98], and Stateless Internet Flow
Filter (SIFF) [99]). In most of these mechanisms, senders
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obtain the capabilities, which are short-term authorizations,
from the receivers and put them as stamps on their packets.
Then, the verification points along the path check if the
traffic is certified as legitimate or not. For instance, in
the capability-based architecture presented in [95], sources
must first obtain ”permission to send” from the destination.
Basically, destination provides tokens, or capabilities, to
sources whose traffic it agrees to accept. The sources then
include these tokens in their packets. The verification points
are distributed around the network to check if the traffic
has been certified as legitimate by destinations and the path
in between, and to discard unauthorized traffic. Privileged
packets are prioritized at the routers and most of the
bandwidth is allocated to them so that they are never dropped
by unprivileged packet flooding. Privileged packets flooding
rarely happens, since receivers can stop any undesirable flow
by not sending the capability back to the senders.
SIFF architecture, which includes a handshake protocol
that is used by sender to obtain capabilities in order to send
privileged traffic, is similar to the capability-based architecture
presented in [95]. However, both the approach in [95] and
SIFF are vulnerable to flooding attacks against capability
setup channel and attacks that flood the receiver using already
acquired capabilities.
TVA addresses the limitations of capability mechanisms
such as SIFF. TVA has the same process for acquiring a
capability as SIFF but different format of capabilities are used
in TVA [97], [98]. There are several disadvantages for the TVA
mechanism:
(i) TVA, like previous capability-based mechanisms,
assumes that the receiver can distinguish the attack traffic from
the legitimate traffic. Hence, its effectiveness depends on the
accuracy of the attack detection mechanism that a receiver is
employing.
(ii) TVA needs a significant amount of per flow state
information to be maintained at each router, and
(iii) specific DDoS attacks are still possible even after all
the routers implement TVA.
Capability-based mechanisms are always active and
their processing and memory costs (overhead) are high.
Furthermore, as we mentioned earlier, in order to prove the
effectiveness of the capability-based mechanisms, one must
first suggest a practical way to secure the capability setup
channel, as well as a efficient algorithm for choosing what
capabilities to offer to unknown sources; these are both
challenging problems to address.
The issue of securely granting capabilities has been
addressed by the source authentication systems that have
been proposed in recent capability-based mechanisms such
as Passport [100] and TVA+ [101]. The Passport system
uses efficient symmetric-key cryptography to put tokens on
packets that allow each AS along the network path to
independently verify that a source address is valid. Passport
employs the routing system to efficiently distribute the
symmetric keys that are used for verification. Figure 5
shows how the border router of a source AS (R2) stamps
source authentication information into the Passport header of
an outbound packet. By adopting Passport, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) can protect their own addresses from being
spoofed at each other’s networks; hence, ISPs have stronger
incentives to deploy Passport than alternatives such as ingress
filtering. Nevertheless, when attackers can get capabilities
from colluders, the capability-based mechanisms such as
Passport become ineffective [102]. For instance, an off-path
attacker who spoofs a legitimate sender’s address and who is
in the same subnet as the sender can obtain the capabilities
by eavesdropping and inject the attack packets using the
capabilities. Another disadvantage of Passport is that it only
prevents hosts in one AS from spoofing the IP addresses of
other ASs. Hence, attackers can spoof the IP address of any
host within the same AS [75]. Passport requires each border
router to store AS paths for all the destination prefixes, and
shared secret keys with all ASs; this approach would require
a considerably large amount of memory for Internet-wide
deployment [75].
Fig. 5. A border router of a source AS (Rb) stamps source authentication
information into the Passport header of an outbound packet. A border router
of an intermediate or destination AS (Rc or Re) verifies this information
[100].
A.1.4.e. Active Internet Traffic Filtering (AITF) as a
filter-based (datagram) mechanism [103]: Capability-based
mechanisms enable a receiver to deny by default all the
traffic and explicitly accept only the traffic that belongs to
established network-layer connections. The alternative could
be the datagram (a.k.a. filtering) mechanism in which a
receiver accepts by default all the traffic and explicitly denies
the traffic that has been identified as undesirable. The datagram
mechanism requires a credible, bounded amount of filtering
resources from participating ISPs, which offers incentives to
ISPs to deploy it.
AITF is a hybrid DDoS defense mechanism which enables
a receiver to contact misbehaving sources and ask them to
stop sending it traffic. Each of the sources that have been
asked to stop is policed by its own ISP, which ensures their
compliances. Each ISP that hosts misbehaving sources must
either support AITF mechanism (i.e., accept to police its
misbehaving clients), or risk losing all of its access to the
complaining receiver; this provides a strong incentive for all
the ISPs to cooperate; especially when the receiver is a popular
point of access. AITF preserves receiver’s bandwidth in the
face of DDoS flooding attacks at a per-client cost; thus, it is
affordable for the ISPs to employ it. Argyraki et al. in [103]
showed that even the first two networks that would deploy
AITF could maintain their connectivity to each other in the
ZARGAR et al.: A SURVEY OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS AGAINST DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) FLOODING ATTACKS 13
face of DDoS flooding attack. AITF verifies the legitimacy of
a filter request using a three-way handshake. However, if the
flooded link is outside a victim’s AS, the three-way handshake
may not complete because the handshake packets traverse
the same flooded link as the attack traffic does, and filters
may not have been installed. Furthermore, AITF has several
deployment problems since it relies on the routers, which are
in the middle of the network (during initial deployment), to
perform the actual filtering [104]. It also depends on various
IP route records to determine where packets come from [104].
A.1.4.f. StopIt [101] is a hybrid filter-based DDoS defense
mechanism that enables each receiver to install a network
filter that blocks the undesirable traffic it receives. StopIt
uses Passport as its secure source authentication system to
prevent source address spoofing. Its design employs a novel
closed-control and open-service architecture to battle strategic
attacks that aim to prevent filters from being installed and
to provide the StopIt service to any host in the Internet.
Figure 6 shows the StopIt architecture and how a destination
Hd installs a filter to block the attack flow (Hs,Hd) from a
source Hs. Each cloud represents an AS boundary. Each AS
has a StopIt server that sends and receives StoptIt requests,
and hosts can only send StopIt requests to their access
routers (e.g., Rs, Rd). Based on the studies in [101], StopIt
outperforms filter-based designs such as AITF, and is effective
in providing continuous non-interrupted communication under
a wide range of DDoS attacks. However, StopIt does not
always outperform capability-based mechanisms. For instance,
if the attack traffic does not reach a victim, but congests
a link shared by the victim, a capability-based mechanism
(e.g., TVA) is more effective. Therefore, both filters (a.k.a.
datagram) and capabilities are highly effective DDoS defense
mechanisms, but neither is more effective than the other
against DDoS flooding attacks.
StopIt mechanism is vulnerable to the attacks in which
attackers flood the routers and StopIt servers with filter
requests and packet floods. In order to prevent these attacks,
the StopIt framework must ensure that a router or a StopIt
server only receives StopIt requests from local nodes in the
same AS, or another StopIt server. In doing so, network
administrators must manually configure the routers and StopIt
requests with the list of hosts, routers, and other StopIt
servers. Such manual configuration for an AS with hundreds
of thousands of nodes is a burdensome task [75]. Furthermore,
StopIt needs complex verification/authentication mechanisms,
and misbehaving StopIt server detection mechanisms to be
implemented in both hosts and routers which makes it a
challenging mechanism to deploy and manage in practice [75].
In [102], [105], TVA as a capability-based mechanism
is compared to StopIt as a filter-based mechanism under
similar assumptions and practical constraints. They compare
six different DDoS flooding mitigation systems, including
TVA and StopIt. They use simulations on realistic topologies
and cover different attack strategies in their research. The
outcome of their research is summarized in Figure 7 [102],
[105]. In Figure 7, attacks’ power is a generalized term
which is defined in [105] based on: number of attackers (i.e.,
number of bots), and size of attack (i.e., packet size). As
Fig. 6. StopIt architecture: How it installs filters on the sources of attack
upon detecting the DDoS attack [95].
the number of attackers and their packet sizes increase the
attack power increases. Effectiveness is also measured [105]
based on the legitimate hosts’ TCP transfer performance (i.e.,
percentage of completed TCP transfers). As the number of
completed transfers increases the mechanisms that have been
employed are more effective. As Yang et al. showed in this
figure, when the attackers’ power is low, both filters and
capabilities work well, although filters work slightly better.
As the attackers’ power increases, filters become ineffective
when they cannot be properly installed, and then capabilities
become ineffective when attackers can get capabilities from
colluders. When the attackers’ power is extremely high, both
filters and capabilities become ineffective, and there should
be some fail-safe mechanisms (e.g., fair queuing) in place to
resolve the problem.
Attacks’ Power Low High 
Both work but Filters perform  
better than Capabilities 
Filters become ineffective 
when they cannot be installed 
Capabilities become ineffective 
when attackers can get capabilities 
Both become ineffective and some 
fail-safe mechanisms are needed 
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Fig. 7. Capability-based (capabilities) vs. datagram-based (Filters)
mechanisms [102].
Discussion: Since attackers cooperate to perform successful
attacks, defenders must also form alliances and collaborate
with each other to defeat the DDoS attacks. The DDoS defense
community is currently more involved in proposing novel
hybrid DDoS defense mechanisms and most of the recently
proposed mechanisms belong to the hybrid category. No single
deployment point (centralized) can successfully defend against
DDoS because of the fundamental challenges we enumerated
for each of the deployment points. A hybrid (Distributed)
defense mechanism is the best way to combat DDoS Attacks.
We have enumerated various hybrid defense mechanisms in
this section; they are comprised of multiple defense nodes
deployed at various locations that cooperate with each other
towards attack prevention, detection, and response. Detecting
DDoS attack as soon as possible and before it reaches the
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF FEATURES, ADVANTAGES, AND DISADVANTAGES OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS AGAINST NETWORK/TRANSPORT-LEVEL DDOS FLOODING
ATTACKS BASED ON THEIR DEPLOYMENT LOCATION
Features Disadvantages Advantages
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
So
ur
ce
-b
as
ed
Detection and response are deployed at the
source hosts
Sources are distributed among different
domains; hence, it is difficult for each of
the sources to detect and filter attack flows
accurately
Difficult to differentiate legitimate and
DDoS attack traffic at the sources, since
the volume of the traffic is not big enough
Low motivation for deployment; since,
it is unclear who would pay the expenses
associated with these services
Aims to detect and respond (i.e., filter) to
the attack traffic at the source and before it
wastes lots of resources
D
es
tin
at
io
n-
ba
se
d
Detection and response are deployed at the
destination hosts (i.e., victims)
They cannot accurately detect and respond
to the attack before it reaches the victims
and wastes resources on the paths to the
victim
Easier and cheaper than other mechanisms
in detecting DDoS attacks because of their
access to the aggregate traffic near the
destination hosts
N
et
w
or
k-
ba
se
d
Detection and response are deployed at the
intermediate networks (i.e., routers)
High storage and processing overhead at
the routers
Attack detection is difficult because
of the lack of availability of sufficient
aggregated traffic destined for the victims
Aims to detect and respond to (i.e.,
filter) the attack traffic at the intermediate
networks and as close to source as possible
D
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
H
yb
ri
d
(D
is
tr
ib
ut
ed
) Detection and response are deployed at
various locations: detection usually occurs
at destinations & intermediate networks,
and response usually occurs at the sources
& upstream routers near the sources
There is a cooperation among various
defense components
Complexity and overhead because of the
cooperation and communication among
distributed components scattered all over
the Internet
Lack of incentives for the service providers
to cooperate/collaborate
Need trusted communication among
various distributed components in order to
cooperate/collaborate
More robust against DDoS attacks
More resources at various levels (e.g.,
destination, source, and network) are
available to tackle DDoS attacks
victims, identifying the attack sources, and finally stopping the
attack as close as possible to the attack sources is the ultimate
goal of DDoS defense mechanisms; we strongly believe that
this can be best achieved through hybrid (Distributed) DDoS
defense mechanisms.
Combining source address authentication (to prevent
IP spoofing), capabilities, and filtering would be the
most effective and efficient solution because of the
robustness of capabilities and the relative simplicity of a
capability-based design. However, there will be a trade-off
between performance and accuracy in any DDoS defense
solution and the goal is to minimize the gap between
performance and accuracy. Table I summarizes the features
of the four categories of defense mechanisms against
network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks that we
classified in this section and enumerates the advantages and
disadvantages of each category.
A.2. Defense mechanisms against application-level DDoS
flooding attacks
In the following, we discuss the defense mechanisms against
application-level DDoS flooding attacks in each of the
categories of the first classification criterion.
A.2.1. Destination-based (server-side) mechanisms: Most
of the application layer protocols are organized in terms of
client-server model. A server is a process that implements
a specific service (e.g., DNS server, Web server). A client
is a process that requests a service from a server. As we
mentioned earlier, destination-based defense mechanisms are
deployed at the destination of the attack (i.e., victim), which
is the server of the application layer protocols’ client-server
model or the reverse proxy7 when we consider a web cluster
hosting different web applications. Most of these mechanisms
closely observe the server and model its clients’ behavior so
that they can detect any anomalies and drop or rate limit the
malicious requests. Some of these major mechanisms against
application-level DDoS flooding attacks are as follows:
A.2.1.a. Defense against Reflection/Amplification attacks:
[106], [108]: Defense mechanisms against reflection attacks
(IP spoofing) have been already discussed in section A.1.1.a.
Most of the defense mechanisms against amplification attacks
are deployed at the server-side and their aim is to detect
malicious traffic from different protocols such as DNS and
SIP by employing various mechanisms such as machine
learning techniques. Here, we review two mechanisms
proposed to defend amplification attacks for the DNS and
SIP application-level protocols. Kambourakis et al. in [106]
7The reverse proxy is a type of proxy server that retrieves resources on
behalf of a client from one or more servers
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propose a DNS Amplification Attacks Detector (DAAD)
mechanism in which they collect the DNS requests and replies
using IPtraf tool [107]. Then, their DAAD tool processes the
captured network data, which are stored in the appropriate
MySQL database, on-the-fly, classifies the requests/replies as
suspicious or not and generates the corresponding alert to
block the DNS requests/replies in the case of an undergoing
attack [106]. In order to detect and block VoIP flooding attacks
specifically and SIP protocol flooding attacks in general Rahul
et al. employ a genetic algorithm to recognize the authorized
users; then, their proposed VoIP Flood Detection System
(VFDS) is used to detect TCP flooding attacks and SIP
flooding attacks on SIP devices using their Jacobian Fast and
Hellinger distance algorithms. In their mechanism the Jacobian
Fast algorithm has been used to fix the threshold limit and
Hellinger distance calculation, which is a statistical anomaly
based algorithm, has been used to detect deviations in traffic
[108].
A.2.1.b. DDoS-Shield [3], [109]: This mechanism uses
statistical methods to detect characteristics of HTTP sessions
and employs rate-limiting as the primary defense mechanism.
DDoS-Shield consists of a suspicion assignment mechanism
and a DDoS-resilient scheduler. The suspicion assignment
mechanism assigns a continuous value as opposed to a binary
measure, which have been assigned by previous mechanisms,
to each client session. The DDoS-resilient scheduler acts as
a rate-limiter and utilizes continues values, assigned by the
suspicion assignment mechanism, to determine if and when
to schedule a session’s requests. However, it is not clear if
a legitimate session is given another chance to receive the
service if it is dropped by the DDoS-resilient scheduler.
A.2.1.c. Anomaly detector based on hidden semi-Markov
model [110]: Xie et al. propose an anomaly detector based on
hidden semi-Markov model to describe the dynamics of the
access matrix and to detect the attacks. They use the entropy of
document popularity fitting to the model to detect the potential
application-layer DDoS attacks. The main disadvantage of this
mechanism is the high complexity of its algorithm.
A.2.1.d. DAT (Defense Against Tilt DDoS attacks) [111]:
This mechanism monitors users’ features (e.g., instant traffic
volume, session behavior, etc.) throughout a connection
session to determine whether users are malicious or not.
For different users’ bahaviors, DAT provides differentiated
services.
A.2.2. Hybrid (Distributed) mechanisms: Hybrid
defense mechanisms are those mechanisms that employ
collaboration/cooperation between clients and servers to
detect and respond to the attacks. For instance, detection is
done at the victim (web server/reverse proxy) and the response
is initiated and distributed to the client-sides by the victim.
Some of the hybrid mechanisms against application-level
DDoS flooding attacks are as follows:
A.2.2.a. Speak-up [112]: The way this mechanism tries to
decrease the number of malicious requests is to encourage all
the clients to automatically send higher volumes of traffic. The
reasoning behind this approach is that attackers are already
using most of their upload bandwidth so cannot react to
the encouragement. On the other hand, good clients have
spare upload bandwidth and will react to the encouragement
by increasing their traffic volumes drastically. The goal of
this mechanism is that the good clients crowd out the bad
ones, thereby capturing a much larger fraction of the server’s
resources than before. Speak-up is applicable mainly against
session flooding attacks and it is not applicable in case of
request flooding attacks and asymmetric attacks. It is also
assumed that server will somehow detect whether or not it
is under attack.
A.2.2.b. DOW (Defense and Offense Wall) [113]: This
mechanism employs the encouragement method which is
presented in the Speak-up mechanism with an anomaly
detection method based on K-means clustering to detect and
filter session flooding attacks, request flooding attacks, and
asymmetric attacks. Like Speak-up, DOW’s encouragement
model (currency model) encourages legitimate clients to
increase their session rates so that they get a chance to
be served. In other words, their detection model drops
suspicious sessions while their currency model encourages
more legitimate sessions. They believe that if these two
models collaborate with each other, normal clients could gain
higher service rates and lower delays in their response times.
However, the main question that remains to be answered
is with regards to the complexity and performance of this
approach. This mechanism at this stage is too resource
consuming to be implemented.
A.2.2.c. Differentiate DDoS flooding bots from human [114],
[115]: Mechanisms of this category try to differentiate between
the traffic from clients with the legitimate users (Human) and
the malicious users (bots). For instance, Kandula et al. [114]
propose a system to protect web clusters from application-level
DDoS attacks by employing Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA
[116]). Their proposed framework optimally divides the
time spent in authenticating new clients and serving the
authenticated ones. One of the main disadvantages of their
approach or any similar approach is that requiring users
to solve puzzles in order to authenticate themselves may
become annoying for the users and introduce more delay
for legitimate users. Furthermore, this policy disables web
crawlers’s access to the web sites; hence, search engines may
not be able to index the content. In order to address the
drawbacks of CAPTCHA-based mechanisms, Oikonomou et
al. [115] propose three defenses against flash-crowd attacks
which differentiate humans from bots based on the uniqueness
of human behavior with regard to (1) request dynamics, (2)
choice of content to access and (3) ability to ignore invisible
content.
A.2.2.d. Admission control and congestion control [117]: In
this mechanism, Srivatsa et al. propose admission control to
limit the number of concurrent clients served by the online
service. Admission control works based on port hiding that
renders the online service invisible to unauthorised clients by
hiding the port number on which the service accepts incoming
requests. Then, they perform congestion control on admitted
clients to allocate more resources to good clients by adaptively
setting the client’s priority level in response to the client’s
requests in a way that incorporates application-level semantics.
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However, this mechanism requires a challenge server, which
can be the target of DDoS attacks.
A.2.2.e. TMH (Trust Management Helmet) [118]: This
mechanism uses trust to differentiate legitimate users and
attackers. The key idea is that servers should give priority
to protecting the connectivity of good users during the
application layer DDoS attacks instead of identifying all the
attack requests. In doing so, each user is assigned a license,
which is cryptographically secured against forgery or replay
attacks, and a trust value, which is based on users’ history.
Detection of attackers is possible by considering these two
features provided by each user.
A.2.2.f. Hybrid detection based on trust and information
theory based metrics [119]: This mechanism proposes a
hybrid detection scheme based on the trust information and
information theory based metrics. This mechanism initially
filters suspicious flows based on the trust value scored by
the client. Then an entropy, which is the information based
metric, is applied for final filtering of suspicious flows. Trust
value for each client is assigned by the server based on the
access pattern of the client and is updated every time the
client communicates with the server. Each request from the
client always includes the trust value to identify itself to the
server. Entropy of requests per session is calculated based on
the Web user browsing behaviour (HTTP request rate, page
viewing time and sequence of the requested objects) of the
client which is captured from the system log during non-attack
cases. Entropy is then used for further rate limiting the flows.
There is a scheduler in the architecture of this mechanism
which schedules the sessions based on the trust value of the
users and the system workload.
Discussion: Detection of and responding to the
application-level DDoS flooding attacks at the servers
or reverse proxies is not effective enough since attack traffic
could have already affected the victims. As we pointed
out in section A.1.5, hybrid defense mechanisms are the
best way to combat DDoS flooding attacks since all of
the defense nodes collaborate with each other to defeat
coordinated DDoS flooding attacks. We enumerate some of
the recent state-of-the-art hybrid defense mechanisms against
application-level DDoS flooding attacks in this section
and since recent attack incidents have proved that current
mechanisms have not been fully successful, advanced defense
mechanisms with novel features are yet to be deployed. Here,
we briefly discuss some of those required features:
(i) Defense mechanisms must be capable of detecting the
attacks independent of the attack’s exact nature of operation
since predicting and detecting all possible attacks by the
attackers is hard.
(ii) Enhanced detection mechanisms should be in place
to better distinguish between the legitimate and malicious
requests. Using metrics such as the request rate, the packet
headers, or the contents of the request may not be sufficient
enough.
(iii) Response mechanisms should be more adaptive in
the sense that legitimate users can claim their fair share
of resources. In other words, a more request throttling
mechanism which assign more server resources to the
legitimate clients should be in place rather than the request
blocking mechanisms.
B. Classification by the point in time (i.e., between the start
and end of a DDoS attack) which defense takes place
B.1. Before the attack (attack prevention): The best point
in time to stop a DDoS attack is at its launching stage.
In other words, attack prevention is the best DDoS defense
solution. The prevention mechanisms can be deployed at
the attack sources, intermediate networks, destinations or a
combination of them. Most of the prevention mechanisms aim
to fix security vulnerabilities (e.g., insecure protocols, weak
authentication schemes, and vulnerable computer systems) that
can be exploited to launch DDoS attacks. Several prevention
mechanisms have been proposed in the literature [120].
There are some general prevention mechanisms that should
be employed almost everywhere (e.g., servers, hosts, and
intermediate networks) and in as many places as possible by
both end hosts and service providers. Some of these general
prevention mechanisms are as follows:
B.1.1. System & Protocol security mechanisms to increase
the overall security of the systems: For instance, by preventing
illegitimate accesses to the machines, removing bugs, updating
installed protocols, installing software patches, removing
unused software, etc [2].
B.1.2. Fail-safe protection: Possible anticipations in case
something goes wrong (e.g., replication of services and
applications in diverse locations in case DDoS attack occurs
successfully, business continuity and disaster management
plans, etc.).
B.1.3. Resource allocation & accounting [2]: Providing
resources to counter DDoS attacks and control users’ access
based on their privileges and behaviors [121]–[123].
B.1.4. Reconfiguration mechanisms: These mechanisms
alter the topology of either the victim network to add more
resources to tolerate the DDoS attack (e.g., resource replication
services [124]) or the intermediate network to isolate the attack
sources (e.g., attack isolation strategies) [2].
B.1.5. Installing firewalls and improved Intrusion Detection
& Prevention Systems (IDPSs): All of the end hosts are
encouraged to install IDPSs to prevent them from being
compromised by the adversaries.
B.1.6. Employing local filters (e.g., Ingress/Egress [55],
History-based IP filtering [73], hop-count filtering [74], Pi
[76], route-based packet filtering [79], [80], etc.) and globally
coordinated filters (e.g., ACC [89], Pushback [89], [90], AD
and parallel-AD [91], TRACK [92], etc.) to block attack flows
before their bombardment is another important category of the
prevention mechanisms against DDoS attacks.
B.1.7. Load balancing [120] and Flow control are two other
mechanisms to prevent DDoS attacks. The former improves
both the performance and mitigation against DDoS attack, and
the latter prevents servers from going down.
B.1.8. Server-side specific security considerations: One
of the main problems regarding application-level flooding
attacks is that there is a lack of security mechanisms or
security policies in place to address the servers vulnerabilities
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against application-level DDoS flooding attacks. Such security
mechanisms or policies can protect servers from various
attacks. For instance, Shekyan in [43] suggest the following
policies as the best protections for the servers in handling the
write readiness for active sockets:
• Do not accept connections with abnormally small
advertised window sizes.
• Do not enable persistent connections and HTTP
pipelining unless performance really benefits from it.
• Limit the absolute connection lifetime to some reasonable
value.
As another example, disabling open recursion8 on name
servers from external sources and only accepting recursive
DNS queries originating from trusted sources has been
proposed as an effective mechanism to diminish the
amplification vector of DNS amplification attacks [125].
Similar security mechanisms or security policies for different
servers, such as, Web servers, application servers, database
servers, etc., should be defined and should be used by
considering current vulnerabilities of the servers against
various application-level DDoS flooding attacks.
B.1.9. Finally, service providers can have strategies in place
to better identify their legitimate users. For instance, they can
put dynamic pricing to network resource usages and charge
their customers differently for the use of different resources
[34]. Another effective service provider strategy was recently
employed by Cisco in their IPS 7.0 code upgrade [54] . IPS 7.0
upgrade has global correlation feature that can be configured
on every service provider IPS sensors so that they are aware
of the network devices with a reputation for malicious activity,
and can take action against them. This feature is useful when
service providers’ network is under attack from a botnet DDoS
attack since sensors can drop all the traffic coming from bad
reputation sources. Furthermore, this whole process is very
inexpensive since it occurs before the signatures are used.
Prevention mechanisms aim to provide systems with
increased security. However, these mechanisms can never
completely remove the threat of DDoS attacks since they are
always vulnerable to novel attacks for which signatures and
patches are not available.
B.2. During the attack (attack detection): The next step
in defending against DDoS attacks is attack detection, which
happens during the attack. The detection mechanisms can also
be deployed at sources, intermediate networks, destinations or
a combination of them.
There are various mechanisms to detect DDoS attacks.
Some of the detection mechanisms detect attack flows
when the network links are congested to a certain level
[77] [126]. Other mechanisms detect DDoS flooding attack
traffic (not vulnerability attacks9) when anomalous patterns
are discovered in both the network/transport-level traffic
and application-level traffic (e.g., MIB information analysis
[70], D-WARD [58], [59], MULTOPS [60], TOPS [61],
8Name servers on the Internet that have recursion enabled provide recursive
DNS responses to anyone (a.k.a. open resolvers).
9Vulnerability attacks are mostly detected by employing databases of known
signatures.
[127]–[129], DDoS-Shield [3], [109], DAT [111]. There are
many IDPSs that are based on these detection mechanisms.
They employ data mining and artificial intelligence techniques
for more accurate detection. These mechanisms monitor some
features/headers of the traffic flows at various locations and
points in time. Basically, they learn the normal behavior of
either the network/transport-level or application-level traffic.
Then, based on the information they have monitored and
collected they can detect any changes on the traffic patterns
and usage patterns of the resources. Based on the analysis in
[130], anomaly detection algorithms to detect a DDoS flooding
attacks can be classified depending on either the monitored
parameters [131] or statistical techniques used (e.g., change
point detection [127], wavelet analysis [128]) or granularity
level of the analysis [129].
As we discussed earlier, the most practical place to detect
DDoS flooding attack is at the victims’ side since abnormal
deviations cannot be easily found until the attack turns to its
final stage. Even after the attack is detected, it is difficult for
the victims to launch an efficient response mechanism because
of the numerous malicious packets that have been aggregated
at the victims’ side. Therefore, defending against DDoS
flooding attacks should be initiated at earlier points in time
and as near as possible to the sources of the attacks. Detecting
(defending) at either intermediate networks or sources of
the attacks have two main advantages: (1) the detection is
more concealed since it is deployed in a separate location
from attack target and (2) the detection mechanism is less
vulnerable to DDoS attacks. However, accurate detection is
not easy or it is even impossible to achieve since there is
not enough evidence to detect attacks at these stages (e.g.,
source and upstream routers). Two fundamental challenges to
detect DDoS flooding attacks in time and as near as possible
to the attack sources are: (1) the lack of a wide deployment of
DDoS defense mechanisms at different points of the Internet,
and (2) the lack of collaboration and cooperation among
distributed deployed defense mechanisms in order to increase
the detection accuracy, decrease unnecessary redundant tasks
(because of the lack of coordination), and, finally, to increase
the performance efficiency of DDoS defense mechanisms. In
case of application-level DDoS flooding attacks, all of the
current detection mechanisms are deployed at the destination
(servers) since it is not possible to perform detection at the
layer 2/layer 3 intermediate networks. However, it will be
possible to stop application-level DDoS flooding attacks at
the intermediate networks if some layer 2/layer 3 extractable
features of these attacks are found by careful analysis of these
attacks and in-depth architecture.
B.3. After the attack (attack source identification and
response): After a DDoS attack is detected, the defense
system should identify the source of the attack and block the
attack traffic. Today, most of the DDoS response mechanisms
cannot completely prevent or stop DDoS attacks. Therefore,
minimizing the attack impact and maximizing the availability
of services is the main focus of all after the attack mechanisms.
Moreover, law enforcement agencies must collaborate and
cooperate with each other in order to gather and submit
evidences that could be used to prosecute attackers. It is
18 IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION
necessary for all the Internet providers to understand that
even if a particular provider would be able to secure its own
assets, it does not secure itself against DDoS attacks as other
compromised hosts of other providers could still be used to
launch attacks on it. Therefore, without collaborating with
others to make sure their assets are also secured, defending
against DDoS attack is almost impossible.
There are two main categories for most of the after the
attack mechanisms:
B.3.1. Attack source identification: The first category of after
the attack mechanisms is responsible to identify the source of
the attack. For instance, an attacker uses host x to launch an
attack by representing the spoofed source address of host y,
IP traceback mechanism must find out the real source address
of the attacker which is host x. This can be accomplished if
there is a way of traversing all the routers from x to the victim
in the reverse order or marking the legitimate paths or packets
so that spoofed or illegitimate ones are identifiable. Towards
this, traceback mechanisms [63]–[68] have been proposed in
the literature.
B.3.2. Initiating a proper response: The second category
of after the attack mechanisms is responsible for initiating
a proper response to the attack. Most of the DDoS defense
mechanisms apply throttling (rate limit) or packet filtering
on upstream routers and hosts for the traffic coming from
those identified attack flows (e.g., spoofed IP addresses) after
identifying the source of the attack. For instance, history-based
IP filtering [73], hop-count filtering [74], Pi [76], AD [91],
TRACK [92], and StopIt [101], [105] employ packet filtering
upon detection of DDoS attacks and ACC [89], Pushback
[89], [90], PAD [91], AITF [103], and DEFCOM [93] employ
throttling upon detection of DDoS attacks. Other mechanisms
specially in the case of application-level DDoS flooding
attacks employ some encouragement models in which servers
ask the legitimate clients to increase their session rates to
crowd out the malicious clients (e.g., Speak-up [112], and
DOW [113]).
VI. DDOS DEFENSE: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
METRICS
Many mitigation and defense mechanisms to address
DDoS attacks have already been proposed in the literature.
However, there is no unique set of consistent metrics
to evaluate these mechanisms. Obviously, monetary cost
(CAPEX and OPEX) can be used to compare DDoS
defense mechanisms, however, this does not evaluate the
effectiveness of the schemes. In this section, we review
and discuss some of the metrics and attributes found in
the literature that can be used to comparatively evaluate
DDoS mitigation techniques [132]. Then, in Table III and
Table IV, we qualitatively compare the defense mechanisms
against network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks and the
defense mechanisms against application-level DDoS flooding
attacks based on their deployment location using some of
these performance measurement metrics such as: defense
strength (accuracy), scalability, delay, system performance
degradation, implementation complexity, and whether these
categories of defense mechanisms are considered as holistic
defense mechanisms or not.
The performance measurement metrics are as follows:
1. Defense Strength: The strength of a defense mechanism
can be measured by various metrics depending on how well
it can prevent, detect, and stop the attacks. These metrics
could be defined based on the decision or prediction that
each defense mechanism makes. Defense mechanisms either
detect and respond to the attacks or miss them. Based on
their responses, there are four possible outcomes as shown
in Table II.
TABLE II
A MATRIX SHOWING THE OUTCOMES OF DDOS MITIGATION/DEFENSE
MECHANISMS COMPARED TO DESIRABLE OUTCOMES
Desirable decision of
the DDoS defense
Negative Positive
DDoS defense decision Negative A BPositive C D
In Table II, outcome A is called true negative (i.e., the
desired outcome was negative and the outcome of the defense
mechanism was negative as well), B is called false negative
(i.e., the desired outcome was positive and the outcome of the
defense mechanism was negative), C is called false positive
(i.e., the desired outcome was negative and the outcome of the
defense mechanism was positive), and D is called true positive
(i.e., the desired outcome was positive and the outcome of the
defense mechanism was also positive).
Based on the outcomes presented in Table II, six metrics,
which have been previously introduced in the artificial
intelligence literature [133], can be employed to evaluate
DDoS defense mechanisms. These metrics are as follows:
1.a. Accuracy ((A+D)/(A+B+C+D)): Ratio of the correct
outcomes of the defense mechanism (true positives and true
negatives) over the total outcomes of the defense mechanism.
1.b. Sensitivity (D/(B+D)): Ratio of true positives over total
desired positive outcomes.
1.c. Specificity (A/(A+C)): Ratio of true negatives over total
desired negative outcomes.
1.d. Precision (D/(C+D)): Ratio of true positives over the
total positive outcomes of the defense mechanism.
1.e. Reliability or False positive rate (C/(C+D)): Ratio of
false positive outcomes of the defense mechanism over total
positive outcomes of the defense mechanism.
1.f. False negative rate (B/(A+B)): Ratio of false negative
outcomes of the defense mechanism over total negative
outcomes of the defense mechanism.
2. Compromise-ability: Could an attacker exploit a defense
mechanism in order to launch attacks (e.g., DDoS) against the
whole system?
3. Delay in detection/response: How long does it take to
detect/react to the attack?
4. System performance degradation: Does a defense
mechanism cause any performance issues (e.g., memory
shortage, lack of CPU cycles) or demand any additional
requirements to perform perfectly?
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TABLE III
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS AGAINST NETWORK/TRANSPORT-LEVEL DDOS FLOODING ATTACKS BASED ON THEIR
DEPLOYMENT LOCATION
Defense
strength
(Accuracy)
Scalability Systemperformance
Implementation
complexity
Holistic
defense
Centralized
Source-based Low Low Moderate Low No
Destination-based High Low Good Low No
Network-based Low Medium Moderate Medium No
Distributed Hybrid (Distributed) Medium Medium-high Poor-moderate Medium-high Yes
TABLE IV
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS AGAINST APPLICATION-LEVEL DDOS FLOODING ATTACKS BASED ON THEIR DEPLOYMENT
LOCATION
Defense
strength
(Accuracy)
Scalability Systemperformance
Implementation
complexity
Holistic
defense
Destination-based
(server-side) High Low Moderate-good Low No
Hybrid
(Distributed) Medium Medium Moderate Medium-high Yes
5. Passive, reactive or proactive: Does a defense
mechanism defend attacks by proactively preventing them
from happening? Does it only react to the existing attacks? or
does it take actions only after the DDoS attacks are launched?
6. Holistic defense: A holistic defense mechanism by
considering all the required tasks in order to stop the DDoS
attacks (i.e., both detection and response).
7. Implementation complexity: One of the important
metrics to compare defense mechanisms is their
implementation complexity. The best defense mechanisms
in this classification are those that are easy and feasible to
implement.
8. Usability: The interface that defense mechanisms provide
to their users should be as user-friendly as possible.
9. Deployment location: As we mentioned earlier,
deployment location is another metric to compare various
defense mechanisms. Each location has its own benefits and
disadvantages which makes one mechanism better than the
other.
10. Scalability: A scalable defense mechanism can
effectively handle its attack detection and response duties
even if both the number of attackers and the amount of attack
traffic increases.
VII. CYBER-INSURANCE & DDOS FLOODING ATTACK
Prevention, protection, and mitigation of cyber
attacks solely by a combination of technical and
operational/procedural means is not a complete cyber defense
strategy. A complete cyber defense strategy must include cyber
risk management that accepts and manages the information
and network security risks [134]. Various organizations
and businesses incorporate cyber risk management as part
of their overall risk management strategy. According to a
recent survey sponsored by Zurich financial services [135],
which was conducted to get an insight on current state
of enterprise-wide information security and cyber liability
risk management, more than two-thirds of the respondents
claimed that information and network security risks were
a specific focus within their organizations. The inability of
technical solutions to provide absolute information or network
security, the defectiveness of traditional insurance policies
to address these kind of risks (i.e., cyber-threats), and the
underdevelopment clarification in the cyber-liability laws has
led to the appearance of cyber-insurance products, as part of
the cyber risk management, to cover losses and liabilities from
the network or information security breaches [136]–[138]. In
other words, cyber-insurance is an insurance product that can
be purchased by organizations to protect them from the risks
that cannot be mitigated [134] and to transfer the financial
consequences of those risks to the cyber-insurance companies
[139]. However, as found in [135], cyber-insurance is not still
part of the cyber risk management of most businesses and
the organizations.
In all of the traditional insurance policies (e.g.,
earthquake/fire protection) offered by insurance companies,
there are some requirements that the property owner should
meet (e.g., policies, standards) before obtaining the insurance
[138]. As with other insurance policies, the cyber-insurance
policy also requires the organizations to take some initial
steps in order to obtain the cyber-insurance. These steps
may include employing various information/network security
standards, privacy policies, and information/network security
assessment frameworks (e.g., Bell Labs security framework
[140], ITU X.805 standard [141], ISO 27002 standard [142])
that most of the time requires significant investments by the
IT organizations. However, most of the private individuals
and organizations are reluctant towards these investments
because they believe that their investments will not be
entirely effective since most of their systems are somehow
connected to the outside systems by either the Internet or
other networked environments and those systems may be
insecure; hence, they may put their own systems at risk [138].
Coverage of DDoS flooding attacks is a common feature
of most current cyber-insurance policies. As we mentioned
earlier, there are some requirements that the property owner
(e.g., service provider) should meet before obtaining the
cyber-insurance. For instance, service providers can enforce
specific policies to insure the security of their customers’
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received services. For example, traffic segregation via VPNs
and cleaning via a number of scrubbing centers in the network
that filter bad traffic (e.g., viruses) and allow only clean traffic
to the customers’ site based on the customers’ Service Level
Agreement (SLA 10) is currently one of the popular policy
practices associated with obtaining cyber-insurance policies
(e.g., IntruGuard [143], Neustar SiteProtect [144], and Cisco
service provider infrastructure security techniques [145]).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive
classification of various DDoS defense mechanisms along with
their advantages and disadvantages based on where and when
they detect and respond to DDoS flooding attacks. An ideal
comprehensive DDoS defense mechanism must have specific
features to combat DDoS flooding attacks both in real-time
and as close as possible to the attack sources. These features
are as follows:
1) More nodes in the Internet should be involved in
preventing, detecting, and responding to DDoS flooding
attacks (i.e., Hybrid (Distributed) defense). As we
discussed earlier, the detection accuracy is high at the
victim side but it is not robust; victims cannot tolerate
high volume of DDoS traffic. Stopping the attacks at the
source could be the best response option but it is very
difficult since the volume of the traffic at the sources
is not significant to differentiate between legitimate and
malicious traffic. Furthermore, the collateral damage
is high at intermediate networks because there is not
enough memory and CPU cycles to profile the traffic.
Therefore, centralized mechanisms in which, all the
defense components (i.e., prevention, detection, and
response) are deployed at the same place, are not practical
against DDoS flooding attacks.
2) There should be collaboration and cooperation among
the key defensive points within and between service
providers in the Internet. The main challenge in order to
achieve this goal is that there should be some economic
incentives among different service providers in order to
achieve highly cooperative defense mechanisms.
3) More reliable mechanisms are required to authenticate
the sources of the Internet traffic so that malicious
users could be identified and held accountable for their
activities (i.e., Anti-spoofing mechanisms).
4) Trusted communication mechanisms for cooperation and
collaboration among various distributed components are
needed. For instance, in the pushback mechanism, rate
limit requests to the upstream routers could be sent by a
malicious point in the network.
We strongly believe that combining source address
authentication, capability mechanisms, and filtering
mechanisms could be the most effective and efficient
way to address the DDoS flooding attacks in a distributed
cooperative/collaborative DDoS defense mechanism. More
development and deployment of distributed defense
10A formal written agreement made between service provider and its
customer, defining the understanding of service requirements between them.
mechanisms from researchers and service providers
respectively is what we expect to see in the near future
(short to medium term). In a longer term we expect to see:
• The inevitable cooperation and collaboration among
service providers to detect and stop the DDoS flooding
attacks closer to their sources. The rapid growth of
collaborative environments such as Cloud Computing
[146] and the Internet of Things (IoT) [147]–[149] leads
to a large number of application developments both in and
for such environments. This expands the threat landscape
for DDoS flooding attacks and speeds up the transition
to the era in which there is an inevitable cooperation and
collaboration among various organizations and service
providers for a stronger and faster defense against DDoS
flooding attacks.
• The incorporation of the results of the attackers’
incentives analysis into future defense strategies (i.e., this
may lead to different strategies based on the attacker’s
motivations).
• The employment of the cross layer traffic analysis and
defense mechanisms (i.e., looking at the information at
multiple protocol layers simultaneously to detect and
respond to the DDoS flooding attacks).
• The development of strict cyber-crime laws and
multi-national enforcement mechanisms along
with refined cyber-insurance policies that require
implementation of DDoS detection and prevention
mechanisms.
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